Classical verification of quantum computational advantage



Gregory D. Kahanamoku-Meyer March 15, 2022

Theory collaborators:

Norman Yao (Berkeley → Harvard) Umesh Vazirani (Berkeley) Soonwon Choi (Berkeley → MIT) arXiv:2104.00687 (theory) arXiv:2112.05156 (expt.)



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Random circuit sampling [Arute et al., Nature '19]



Gaussian boson sampling [Zhong et al., Science '20]

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Biggest experiments impossible to classically simulate-how do we verify the output?

"[Rule] out alternative [classical] hypotheses" [Zhong et al.] Quantum is the only reasonable explanation for observed behavior, under some assumptions about the inner workings of the device

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Reframing: disprove null hypothesis that output was generated classically.

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NISQ: Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum devices



#### Making number theoretic problems less costly

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Can we demonstrate quantum capability without needing to solve such a hard problem?

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Impostor has 50% chance of passing-iterate for exponential certainty.

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Goal: find protocol as verifiable and classically hard as factoring but less expensive than actually finding factors (via Shor)

### Interactive proofs of quantumness

#### Multiple rounds of interaction between the prover and verifier



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Round 1: Prover commits to holding a specific quantum state

Round 2: Verifier asks for measurement in specific basis, prover performs it

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Round 1: Prover commits to holding a specific quantum state

Round 2: Verifier asks for measurement in specific basis, prover performs it

By randomizing choice of basis and repeating interaction, can ensure prover would respond correctly in *any* basis

Brakerski, Christiano, Mahadev, Vidick, Vazirani '18 (arXiv:1804.00640).

Can be extended to verify arbitrary quantum computations! (arXiv:1804.01082)

How does the prover commit to a state?

Consider a **2-to-1** function f: for all y in range of f, there exist  $(x_0, x_1)$  such that  $y = f(x_0) = f(x_1)$ .

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Generating a valid state without trapdoor uses superposition + wavefunction collapse—inherently quantum!
$f(x) = x^2 \mod N$ , where N = pq

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**Example:**  $4^2 \equiv 11^2 \equiv 16 \pmod{35}$ ; and 11 - 4 = 7









**Z basis**: get  $x_0$  or  $x_1$ **X basis**: get some bitstring *d*, such that  $d \cdot x_0 = d \cdot x_1$ 



Z basis: get  $x_0$  or  $x_1$ X basis: get some bitstring d, such that  $d \cdot x_0 = d \cdot x_1$ Hardness of finding  $(x_0, x_1)$  does *not* imply hardness of measurement results!



#### Hardness of finding $(x_0, x_1)$ does *not* imply hardness of measurement results!



Hardness of finding  $(x_0, x_1)$  does *not* imply hardness of measurement results! Protocol requires strong claw-free property: For any  $x_0$ , hard to find even a single bit about  $x_1$ .

Function family	Trapdoor	Claw-free	Strong claw-free
Learning-with-Errors [1]	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	✓	<ul> <li>Image: A set of the set of the</li></ul>
Ring Learning-with-Errors [2]	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	✓	×
x <sup>2</sup> mod N [3]	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	✓	×
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#### Replace X basis measurement with "single-qubit Bell test"

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 $\begin{aligned} |x_0\rangle\,|x_0\cdot r\rangle + |x_1\rangle\,|x_1\cdot r\rangle \\ \text{Measure all but ancilla in X basis} \end{aligned}$ 

Measure qubit in basis





Pick random bitstring r

Pick (Z	+ X) c	or (Z –	- X) ba	asis
Valida	te aga	inst r,	$x_0, x_1$	, d

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This protocol can use any trapdoor claw-free function!

 $p_Z$ : Success rate for Z basis measurement.

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Note: Let  $p_Z = 1$ . Then for  $p_{\text{Bell}}$ :

Classical bound 75%, ideal quantum  $\sim$  85%. Same as regular Bell test!

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Asymptotically: evaluating  $x^2 \mod N$  requires  $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$  gates;  $a^x \mod N$  in Shor requires  $\mathcal{O}(n^2 \log n)$ 

(can also use other TCFs, and other optimizations...)

## Moving towards efficiently-verifiable quantum advantage in the near term

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Interaction

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- Removing need for strong claw-free property allows use of "easier" functions
- Measurement-based uncomputation scheme [2]



#### Trapped Ion Quantum Information lab at U. Maryland (ightarrow Duke)

First demonstration of these protocols, in trapped ions! (arXiv:2112.05156)



Dr. Daiwei Zhu



Prof. Crystal Noel



Prof. Christopher Monroe

and others!



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Partial measurement:

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## Interactive proofs on a few qubits

Experimental results for  $f(x) = x^2 \mod N$ 

**Up** and **right** is stronger evidence of quantumness

GDKM, D. Zhu, et al. (arXiv:2112.05156)



Bottleneck: Evaluating TCF on quantum superposition

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## Improving the protocol itself:

- · Remove trapdoor—symmetric key/hash-based cryptography
- Explore other protocols (verifiable sampling?)

# Questions?

## arXiv:2112.05156 (experiment)



#### arXiv:2104.00687 (theory)



## gregdmeyer.github.io

## Gregory D. Kahanamoku-Meyer

# Backup!

# Noisy intermediate scale verifiable quantum advantage

NISQ: Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum devices



# Adding structure to sampling problems

Generically: seems hard.

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[GDKM 2019]: Classical algorithm to extract the secret from H
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 (1)

[Shepherd, Bremner 2009]: Can hide a secret in *H*, such that evolving and sampling gives results correlated with secret

[Bremner, Josza, Shepherd 2010]: classically simulating IQP Hamiltonians is hard

[GDKM 2019]: Classical algorithm to extract the secret from H

Adding structure opens opportunities for classical cheating



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"Rewinding" proof of hardness doesn't go through for quantum prover—can even use functions that are quantum claw-free!

Cooperative two-player game; players can't communicate (non-local).



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**Classical optimal strategy:** return equal values, hope you didn't both get heads. 75% success rate.

Can we do better with entanglement?

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When we generate  $\sum_{x} |x\rangle |f(x)\rangle$ , add redundancy to f(x), for bit flip error detection!

#### Technique: postselection

How to deal with high fidelity requirement? Naively need  $\sim 83\%$  overall circuit fidelity to pass.



Numerical results for  $x^2 \mod N$  with  $\log N = 512$  bits. Here: make transformation  $x^2 \mod N \Rightarrow (kx)^2 \mod k^2 N$ 

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Protocol allows us to make circuits irreversible!

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Lots of time and space overhead!

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Can we "measure them away" instead?

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Can directly convert classical circuits to quantum! 1024-bit  $x^2 \mod N$  in depth 10<sup>5</sup> (and can be improved?)

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Advantages:

- Everything is diagonal (it's just a phase)!
- Modulo is automatic in the phase
- Simple decomposition into few-qubit gates
# Implementation

New goal: 
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$$a \cdot b = \sum_{i,j} 2^{i+j} a_i b_j$$

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- Binary multiplication is AND
- "Apply phase whenever  $x_i = x_j = z_k = 1$ "
- These are CCPhase gates (of arb. phase)!

# Leveraging the Rydberg blockade



### Leveraging the Rydberg blockade



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### **Problem (not TCF):** Consider a group $\mathbb{G}$ of order *N*, with generator *g*. Given the tuple $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$ , determine if c = ab.

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Trapdoor [Peikert, Waters '08; Freeman et al. '10]: linear algebra in the exponent Claw-free [GDKM et al. '21 (arXiv:2104.00687)]: collisions in linear algebra in the exponent!

### Full protocol

